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Abstract
The adoption of digital contact tracing (DCT) technology during the COVID-19
pandemic has shown multiple benefits, including helping to slow the spread of
an infectious disease and to improve the dissemination of accurate information.
However, to support both ethical technology deployment and user adoption, privacy
must be at the forefront. With the loss of privacy being a critical threat, thorough
threat modeling will help us to strategize and protect privacy as digital contact
tracing technologies advance.
Various threat modeling frameworks exist today, such as LINDDUN, STRIDE,
PASTA, and NIST, which focus on software system privacy, system security, appli-
cation security, and data-centric risk, respectively. When applied to the exposure
notification system (ENS) context, these models provide a thorough view of the
software side but fall short in addressing the integrated nature of hardware, humans,
regulations, and software involved in such systems. Our approach addresses ENSs
as a whole and provides a model that addresses the privacy complexities of a multi-
faceted solution. We define privacy principles, privacy threats, attacker capabilities,
and a comprehensive threat model. Finally, we outline threat mitigation strategies
that address the various threats defined in our model.
1 Introduction
Privacy is one of the most important components when evaluating a digital contact tracing system.
Privacy is of paramount importance due to multiple reasons ranging from government policies and
regulations to adoption by individuals. Existing threat modeling frameworks and approaches focus
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mostly on security threats and effectiveness during the software development life-cycle (SDLC).
Digital tracking of COVID-19 infections requires leveraging the existing components, such as web
server technologies, to build new services such as exposure notification (EN) apps. The repurposing of
existing components and the algorithmic nature of DCT leads to radically different privacy concerns
not considered while designing or using those components in traditional ways. Hence, an enhanced
approach is needed for privacy threat modeling and privacy impact assessment for CT capabilities.
We have started with evaluating existing threat modeling frameworks like LINDDUN [15], STRIDE
[14], PASTA [16], and NIST [11] for use in privacy threat modeling. Most of the privacy threat
models provide a software-centric approach to threat modeling and fall short when it comes to
non-stereotypical privacy attacks like coercion attacks or complying with evolving privacy directives
such as ePrivacy directives from European Data Privacy Board (EDPB) [2]. To address the additional
privacy requirements, we propose a few enhancements to existing privacy threat models. First, we
propose a modeling approach based on target state attacker capabilities and applicable exhaustive
threat categories. The target state ensures the minimization of false positives, the minimization of
overlooked threats, and a consistent result regardless of who is doing the threat modeling. Another
proposed enhancement is to simplify threat models to accommodate many-to-many relationships
between threat categories and attacker capabilities. Finally, in order to avoid confusion, we have
standardized the terms used across target privacy threat models.
This document first introduces the enhanced framework and then uses the framework to build the
Target Privacy Threat Model for Exposure Notification System (ENS).
2 Terminology
There are a variety of ways to leverage technology to aid the manual contact tracing process. Tradi-
tionally, this process involves a public health official interviewing a person who has been diagnosed
with an infectious disease in order to identify who they may have had contact with so that these
contacts can be alerted to take proper measures to prevent further spread of the virus. Apps that have
been built to help with this process typically alert users who have had a potential virus exposure,
rather than performing tracing of contacts. As such, these apps are often referred to as exposure
notification (EN) or exposure alerting (EA) apps. The functionality provided works in conjunction
with manual contact tracing to scale the efforts of early quarantine and other preventive measures.
Some applications provide additional features beyond exposure notification and therefore may not be
pure EN apps. In this paper, we use the umbrella term exposure notification systems (ENS) to refer to
EN, EA, and apps with functionality to aid in scaling outcomes of manual contact tracing, though it
is important to note that privacy-preserving applications under this umbrella do not typically “trace”
users and their contacts.
3 Target Privacy Threat Modeling Framework
The Target Privacy Threat Modeling (TPTM) Framework is a privacy-driven threat modeling frame-
work that helps to systematically identify privacy attacker capabilities and mitigate privacy threats in
a system or an interconnected platform. The TPTM Framework leverages an attacker-centric threat
model that is driven by the attacker’s capabilities and motivations to exploit the privacy vulnerabilities.
Also, as a privacy threat model framework, the focus is on attacker goals that compromise the privacy
of users, rather than their security.
The following diagram shows various steps of the TPTM Framework:
The TPTM Framework starts with privacy principles and identifies the resources and/or assets in
the scope. Threat models help to identify attacker goals and capabilities in the context of specific
information flow diagrams and develop effective mitigation strategies. The TPTM Framework
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recommends doing threat modeling at various phases of the development and deployment of the
systems.
4 Target Privacy Threat Modeling Framework for Exposure Notification
Systems
ENS, which has become an important toolset in mitigating COVID-19, has two principal components:
• Case management: Key functions are i) streamlined electronic capture and management
of data on patient and contacts and ii) integrated workflows with surveillance systems.
• Proximity tracing / exposure notification: Key functions are i) use opt-in digital tools to
augment manual contact tracing and ii) use Bluetooth technologies to compute proximity
and duration of exposure to patients diagnosed with COVID-19.
4.1 ENS Architectural Approaches
All of the ENS solution implementations fall into one of three categories of architecture:
• A centralized architecture: The anonymity of users and confidentiality of contact events is
only provided with regard to outside entities, i.e., other users or external actors; the operators
and involved authorities can, however, identify all users and connect them to recorded
contact histories.
• A partially decentralized architecture: Users and contact events are only concealed from
other users and third parties; the server can de-anonymize positively tested users. The
system also has a data donation function, by which users can choose to share their contact
histories for epidemiological research. If done so, positively tested users’ contact events
would become visible to operators and authorities.
• A completely decentralized architecture: Users remain anonymous toward other users
and third parties, and their contact events also remain private. Operators and authorities can
de-anonymize positively tested users but cannot access their contact history. Epidemiological
research is not possible.
Each of the architectures mentioned above results in different threat models and hence different
mitigation strategies. Before we get into specifics of threat models, let us first identify privacy
principles.
4.2 Privacy Principles
Privacy principles form the base for the scope and key business requirements of ENS approaches.
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has been the gold standard for personal data protection,
and this document uses GDPR and related privacy directives from EDPB. The following are key
privacy principles used as the scope for the target threat modeling:
• Lawful: ENS and related components must comply with all applicable laws, rules, and
regulations. Any data collection and use must have a lawful basis.
• Informed consent: A user must provide informed consent as a prerequisite for the installa-
tion and use of ENS. A user should be able to give their consent to each function of an app
separately, such as the collection of proximity data, location data, sharing data, or other key
separate functions.
• Purpose binding: Purpose binding ensures that personal data processing is performed
according to predetermined purposes.
• Identity control: Users make the determination to release redacted, disconnected, and/or
aggregated space-time points from location data, or obfuscated identifiers from e.g., Blue-
tooth.
• Transparency: Consumers should be given notice of an organization’s information practices
before any personal information is collected from them.
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• Accountability: In order to ensure that organizations adhere to ENS privacy principles,
there must be enforcement measures.
• Proportionality: The potential risk that private information may be exposed to or misused
as a result of the ENS must be proportional to the public health benefits of that system for
combating the epidemic.
• Data retention: To minimize risk of improper data use, breach, or loss, ENS must have
responsible data retention procedures, e.g., practicing data minimization and destroying data
after a set amount of time.
4.3 Entities
The main entities for privacy threat modeling are the data subject, the data controller, and the data
processor(s). The following table depicts different actors under each of the entity groups:
Entity Type Actors and Participants
Data Subject Users or business entities of ENS or related resources
Controller Health authorities, government, and other parties determining purposes
and means of processing personal data
Processor Organizations providing resources for data processing, such as cloud
computing providers, database providers, app providers, etc.
4.4 Identify resources and assets
Resources are typically software components or tools used in ENS. In addition to privacy principles,
the assets and the resources drive the scope of the target threat modeling activities. The following
table lists all of the components/services used in each of the architectural approaches.
Architectural Approach Related Resources/Assets Example
Centralized Architecture Web server, browser, mobile app,
databases, algorithms, and app stores.
Singapore’s TraceTogether
[12]
Partially Decentralized Archi-
tecture
Web server, browser, mobile app,
databases, algorithms, app stores, and
support services.
PathCheck Foundation apps
[5], Germany’s Corona Warn
[4], Ireland’s Covid Tracker
[7]
Decentralized Architecture Mobile app, app stores, and support ser-
vices.
TraceCorona [9]
Resources or assets are evolving as time passes and all the vendors, including Google and Apple, are
updating the software and other assets continuously. For this paper, we are considering the following
versions / frameworks only:
• Google Exposure Notification Server v0.7.0
• GAEN Exposure Notification API v1.5 [8]
• Pan-European Consortium (PEPP-PT)
• DP-3T
• Apple iOS 11 or greater
• Android 8 or greater
For target threat models, we take superset of the resources required for all three architectural
approaches.
4.5 Information Flow Diagrams (IFDs)
Data flow diagrams (DFDs) traditionally used to identify privacy threats are not effective for privacy
identifiers in ENS. DFD-based threat modeling fundamentally looks at how data is designed to move
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through a system. The approach cannot, therefore, provide a means to inherently analyze how an
application appears to a potential attacker. Instead, we propose information flow diagrams, IFDs, to
identify all privacy identifiers in functional and/or business terms.
The figure below depicts an IFD for a partially decentralized architecture (GAEN mobile app /
Express Server):
4.6 Privacy Identifiers
Privacy Identifiers are any data, element, or information that can be used, directly or as a proxy, to
identify a person or group of persons. The following table lists most of the direct and indirect privacy
identifiers in the target state of ENS.
Direct Privacy Identifiers Indirect Privacy Identifiers
Name, address, user email, phone IMEI, IP ad-
dress, MAC address
Location data, local public health agency, age
of the user, infection status, device model / ver-
sion, gender, date of interview, temporary encryp-
tion key (TEK), associated encrypted metadata
(AEMD), pseudonyms
Several non-identifiers are being used in ENS as well, such as transaction logging data, OS versions,
Locale, TAN, etc.
4.7 Privacy Threat Categories
Privacy threat categories provide high-level goals of the attacker(s). In traditional privacy threat
modeling approaches, threat categories are identified separately from the attacker’s goals and we
combine both of them for easier reference.
• Surveillance is the observation or monitoring of an individual’s communications or activi-
ties.
• Stored data compromise refers to end systems that do not take adequate measures to secure
stored data from unauthorized or inappropriate access.
• Misattribution occurs when data or communications related to one individual are attributed
to another.
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• Secondary use is the use of collected information about an individual without the individ-
ual’s consent for a purpose different from that for which the information was collected.
• Exclusion is the failure to allow individuals to know about the data that others have about
them or to participate in its handling and use.
• Linkability is a higher-level goal of a privacy attacker and refers to the ability to identify
related items in two (or more) seemingly unrelated datasets. From an attacker’s perspective,
this is done with the intention of identifying a person or a location. For example: identifying
a place of worship based on the times when groups of people gathered there.
• Identification is a higher-level goal of a privacy attacker. It uses adversarial tactics to
identify or de-anonymize a person or a group of people. This can either be done with the
data directly, or by some combination or observation of various types of datasets. It can also
occur during any phase of the information flow (or app usage in this case).
• Detection is when an attacker is able to detect whether a piece of data exists or not. A
common example of this is membership inference, where the attacker is able to tell whether
or not a particular individual is present within a dataset.
• Non-repudiation occurs when a user is unable to refute that a piece of data belongs to them.
In the context of digital exposure notification, imagine a user being unable to deny that a
certain anonymous value was transmitted by their device.
• Integrity compromise is a higher-level goal of a privacy attacker, as well. These attacks
aim to compromise the validity or trustworthiness of infection or location data. This can
happen during the broadcast phase, when an attacker may aim to broadcast dishonest values
or broadcast values with dishonest metadata/properties. It could happen during the reporting
phase, when an attacker may aim to report a dishonest positive infection result. It could also
happen during the download phase, when an attacker may aim to block downloads of honest
values.
4.8 Attacker Capabilities
These are means by which some attackers may be able to achieve attacker goals. The attacker
capabilities are not completely mutually exclusive to each other and may result in overlaps in threat
models.
Coercion attacks are especially threatening during COVID-19. Coercion is a unique type of privacy
threat that aims to manipulate a user in order to divulge information that compromises privacy.
This threat can be particularly difficult to combat because it involves the human aspect of the
ecosystem. During a severe pandemic, people are anxious about their health and safety, and attackers
have launched fraudulent schemes preying on COVID-19 anxieties. Coercing citizens to divulge
information poses a privacy threat that could allow an attacker to identify, detect, or manipulate data.
Data disclosure could pose a serious privacy threat for mobile app users. In the ideal case, a server
storing positive infection data does not collect any information that could potentially identify a
user. In other words, even the server couldn’t learn any information about the users behind the data.
However, various aspects could affect this server privacy such as the collection of metadata or the
length of time data is stored, among other things. If an attacker is able to gain access to the server
and thus to the data stored on the server, these factors could affect what privacy leakage occurs. Data
disclosure could occur through any of the nodes where data either stays at rest or in flow.
Eavesdropping can be passive or active but always refers to an attacker observing communication
for a malicious purpose. One scenario that could take place in the context of ENS is for an attacker to
place Bluetooth devices that observe and collect transmitted contact numbers. With the knowledge of
a collection device’s location and the positive infection status, an attacker could detect whether an
observed device is part of the positive infection set, or could identify other devices that may have
gotten an exposure notification due to the positive infection dataset. Finally, with the additional data
captured during eavesdropping and the datasets available to a user, capability to combine multiple
datasets, an attacker could combine information and perform a linkage attack causing additional
privacy leakage. Eavesdropping could be at different layers and different stages of the operation. In
addition to the cases discussed for bluetooth signal eavesdropping, an attacker could also eavesdrop
on an app’s interaction with the operating system and use it to identify privacy sensitive information
about the user. Such examples have been explored exhaustively in the side-channel attack literature.
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Replay attacks re-transmit legitimate data with the goal of gaining information or disrupting typical
functionality. In an ENS, this could take the form of an attacker replaying any anonymous values
that were observed while listening on Bluetooth channels. This could cause devices to think they had
contact with a device they did not have contact with. An attack of this type could overwhelm manual
contact tracing infrastructure, or more generally cause anxiety in citizens.
Spoofing is an adversarial action to impersonate a user in order to either disseminate fraudulent data
or collect data that does not belong to the attacker. For ENS, an attacker may attempt to spoof contact
events or even positive infection statuses, affecting the integrity of data. Another form of spoofing
attack is to tamper with the data.
Tampering with data refers to data being changed, either to another seemingly valid value or to a
meaningless value that may compromise the usefulness of a dataset. Because many ENS mobile
apps are decentralized, meaning that data is processed on the devices themselves, tampering may
be a bigger threat on application servers that may store data for a specific purpose related to the app
functionality.
4.9 Privacy Threat Model
There are multiple ways to represent privacy threat models and we choose to use a simplified tabular
representation. All of the threat types described below are reproduced using various tools such as
mitmproxy [10] and GAEN Explorer [13] or using experiments done by other researchers [1, 8, 6].
Also, we have not included any security or other adversarial attacks, such as Drain Attacks as they
don’t directly impact privacy of the data subjects.
D - Direct Identifier I - Indirect Identifier
Attacker Capability - Coercion Attacks
CA001 Infection status or potential exposure of the person revealed in mobile
apps
Attacker Goals Stored data compromise, identification
Attackers Authorities, organizations, employers, assailants
Privacy Identifiers Infection status (D), exposure details (I)
Attack Details Attackers may coerce the user to show, in the mobile app, the infection
status or potential exposure to infection.
CA002 Suitable ways of withdrawing consent are not built into mobile apps
Attacker Goals Secondary use
Attackers Authorities, organizations
Privacy Identifiers Infection status (D), exposure details (I)
Attack Details Consent is used as a legal basis for data processing and the attackers
can make the design of the mobile app complicated for the users trying
to withdraw their consent.
CA003 A law-enforcement attacker can compromise privacy using a subpoena
Attacker Goals Stored data compromise, identification
Attackers Authorities, hackers, assailants
Privacy Identifiers Infection status (D), exposure details (I)
Attack Details Authorities can force the users to disclose their private information
stored in the mobile app using a legal mechanism such as a subpoena.
The attacker then can learn the social interactions of the user of the
mobile app.
CA004 Users are not given sufficient information about the app
Attacker Goals Stored data compromise, identification
Attackers Authorities, hackers, assailants
Privacy Identifiers Infection status (D), exposure details (I), and other personal information
Attack Details Attackers can use misinformation to force users to upload private
information to a server and consequently reveal user information.
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Attacker Capability - Data Disclosure
DD001 Users lose control of their mobile device, allowing the people to see
personal health data
Attacker Goals Stored data compromise, identification
Attackers Hackers, organizers, assailants
Privacy Identifiers Infection status (D), exposure details (I)
Attack Details Users lose control of their phone, allowing people to see all the data
including infection status, date of infection, and other personal data.
DD002 Privacy leaks while using third-party tools and technologies
Attacker Goals Stored data compromise, identification, linkability
Attackers Authorities, hackers, assailants
Privacy Identifiers Infection status (D), exposure details (I), user details (D)
Attack Details Third-party tools, used in conjunction with mobile apps or web servers
for various purposes like troubleshooting, are likely to disclose private
data. For example, when the “Usage and diagnostics” option in Google
Play Services is enabled (which it is by default), then telemetry data
on GAEN operation is shared with Google.
DD003 Indefinite storage of data and possible later linkage with other personal
data
Attacker Goals Stored data compromise, identification, linkability
Attackers Authorities, hackers, assailants
Privacy Identifiers Infection status (D), exposure details (I), user details (D)
Attack Details Authorities, either deliberately or through misconfigured implementa-
tions, retain the data permanently. It would be possible to link the data
retroactively with other data to carry out de-anonymization attacks.
Attacker Capability - Eavesdropping
EV001 Identification of users based on communication data
Attacker Goals Identification, surveillance, linkability
Attackers Authorities, organizations, hackers
Privacy Identifiers TEK (D), IP address (I), Device information (I)
Attack Details When a user chooses to share TEK with the designated health au-
thorities, the operators can identify personal details of the users by
means of communication metadata such as IP address. This results in
re-identification of the users and associated healthcare data like TEK.
EV002 Profiling user movement using daily RPID generated
Attacker Goals Identification, surveillance, linkability
Attackers Authorities, organizations, hackers
Privacy Identifiers TEK (D), IP address (I), device information (I), location information
(I)
Attack Details Attackers can build movement profiles of the users using RPIDs cap-
tured using Bluetooth LE sniffers and capture RPIDs and TEKs down-
loaded. Using the movement profiles, especially public locations like
train stations or office locations, user de-anonymization is possible.
EV003 Profiling user movement using daily RPID generated
Attacker Goals Identification, surveillance, linkability
Attackers Authorities, organizations, hackers
Privacy Identifiers TEK (D), IP address (I), device information (I), location information
(I)
Attack Details Attackers can build movement profiles of the users using RPIDs cap-
tured using Bluetooth LE sniffers and capture RPIDs and TEKs down-
loaded. Using the movement profiles, especially public locations like
train stations or office locations, user de-anonymization is possible.
EV004 Tracing using Bluetooth interface’s MAC address
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Attacker Goals Identification, surveillance, linkability
Attackers Authorities, organizations, hackers
Privacy Identifiers IP address (I), device information (I), location information (I)
Attack Details Smartphones with Bluetooth enabled can be traced with the help of
the Bluetooth interface’s MAC address. An attacker could use this
technique to trace users at specific locations.
Attacker Capability - Spoofing, Tracing, and Replay Attacks
ST001 BLE range extensions can generate false positives
Attacker Goals Integrity compromise
Attackers Hackers, authorities, organizations, employers, assailants
Privacy Identifiers Infection status (D), location (I)
Attack Details To cause false alarms, an attacker can place BLE range extenders to
spoof that a device is “nearby” when it may not be. To complete
the attack, the attacker must ensure that the interactions between the
attacker’s device and other devices are logged as a contact event.
ST002 Generate false alarms though active relays
Attacker Goals Integrity compromise
Attackers Hackers, authorities, organizations, employers, assailants
Privacy Identifiers Infection status (D), location (I)
Attack Details An attacker can generate a false alarm by real-time relay attacks that
lead to the users falsely being alerted that they may have had a positive
exposure. One attacker tactic could be via the relay of Bluetooth
signals from the people tested at testing centers to other phones in the
proximity.
ST003 Generate wormhole attacks
Attacker Goals Integrity compromise, misattribution, exclusion
Attackers Hackers, authorities, organizations, employers, assailants
Privacy Identifiers Infection status (D), location (I)
Attack Details Using commercially available Bluetooth LE sniffers, attackers can
collect RPIDs and pass them onto more distant locations without being
noticed. This compromises the contact tracing system as a whole by
falsely duplicating information about the presence of infected persons
in many locations.
ST004 A verification code used to upload information of another app
Attacker Goals Stored data compromise, identification
Attackers Authorities, service provider, employers, hackers
Privacy Identifiers Infection status (D)
Attack Details An attacker can use a verification code, generated for an infected
person to upload their temporary encryption key (TEK), in another
app to upload their information, resulting in compromise of the overall
system.
4.10 Threat Mitigation Strategy
We propose Privacy by Design methodology [3], developed by Anne Cavoukian, Ontario’s Data
Protection Commissioner, because of its applicability in mitigating conventional and non-stereotypical
threats. Also, we didn’t provide a prescriptive threat mitigation strategy because the mitigation strategy
can be applied at various levels, ranging from legal frameworks to technical solutions like differential
privacy for data stored in the servers.
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The following table lists all mitigation strategies and privacy attacks the respective mitigation strategy
addresses:
Mitigation Strategies Details Privacy Attacks Addressed
Applying a
Privacy-by-Design
approach for
developing ENS
solution components
(mobile app, backend
server, etc.)
Data Minimization: Identify and use
only required attributes. Remove / de-
stroy any data, whether direct identifier
or indirect identifiers, when they are no
longer required. The cryptographic to-
kens shared by the apps should be valid
for the shortest interval and should be
continuously replaced with new tokens,
so that an app cannot be tracked using
the tokens it shares.
DD02, DD003
Data Separation: Isolate and distribute
processing of personal data. Processing
separation to be applied at different com-
ponents of DCT including separation of
verification activities from exposure no-
tifications [13]. Further levels of privacy
can be attained by using methods like
multi-party computation or secure en-
claves in order to ensure privacy of data
during computation.
DD002
Data Abstraction and Perturbation: Ag-
gregate and add noise to the data at
source. For example, it is recommended
that data is abstracted or perturbed be-
fore the data is uploaded from mobile
app to the servers. Usage of standard
metrics and mechanisms for perturbation
like differential privacy should be used.
DD002, DD003
Inform: Inform users and data subjects
about the processing of their personal
data in a timely and detailed manner.
CA004
Control: Put users and data subjects in
control over processing of their personal
data and provide easy-to-use interfaces
to opt-out from data sharing.
CA001*, CA002*, CA003*,
DD001*
Visibility: Provide visibility into how
the personal data is processed and what
privacy-enhancing techniques used.
Regulation: Impose strict data process-
ing and usage regulations at the insti-
tutional level and establish role based
access control within an organization.
Securing communica-
tion between various
components
Enabling SSL certificates for all data-in-
transit communication.
EV001
Removing HTTP headers like ‘Autho-
rization’ reduces linkability issues.
EV001
HMAC enhancements to mitigate relay
and replay attacks. [3]
EV002*,EV003*,ST002*,
ST001*
Use Reference Architec-
tures for ENS
Follow proven reference architecture rec-
ommendations [6] like separation of pro-
cessing, authentication, etc.
EV002*, EV003*, ST004
Keep mobile apps and server compo-
nents current with latest APIs, patches,
and OS upgrades.
EV004
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Perform end-to-end security and vulner-
ability assessment of the DCT compo-
nents.
ST001*, ST002*, ST004*
*Minimizes the attack and does not fully mitigate the attack
5 Conclusion
Although there are existing threat models which aim to address privacy challenges, the unique
ecosystem within exposure notification systems requires a more comprehensive approach. To this
end, we introduce an enhanced framework for Target State Privacy Threat Modeling, which simplifies
terminology, minimizes overlooked threats, and ensures consistency across instances of the threat
model.
Further, we used our newly enhanced framework to build a Target State Privacy Threat Model for
ENS. This model reflects the comprehensive privacy concerns faced by exposure notification systems
and defines specific privacy threats based on attacker capabilities, including what privacy identifiers
are affected and how the attack might take place.
Finally, we provide mitigation strategies that should be taken to address the threats identified in the
ENS Target State Privacy Threat Model.
Glossary
Term/Acronym Description Reference
Privacy Identifiers Any data, element, or informa-
tion that can be used, directly or
as a proxy, to identify a person
or group of persons.
LINDDUN Systematic elicitation and miti-
gation of privacy threats in soft-
ware systems
https://www.linddun.org/
STRIDE approach to threat modeling https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Threat_model
PASTA Process for Attack Simulation
and Threat Analysis (PASTA)
seven-step, risk-centric method-
ology.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Threat_model
NIST physical sciences laboratory and
a non-regulatory agency of the
United States Department of
Commerce.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
National_Institute_of_Standards_
and_Technology
DCT Digital Contact Tracing https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Digital_contact_tracing
GDPR General Data Protection Regula-
tion (GDPR) has been the gold
standard for personal data pro-
tection
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
General_Data_Protection_Regulation
EDPB European Data Privacy Board https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
European_Data_Protection_Board
TAN Acronym for "[Transaction Au-
thentication Number]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Transaction_authentication_number
SMS Short message service https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SMS
DFD Data Flow Diagrams https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Data-flow_diagram
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IFD Information flow diagram https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Information_flow_diagram
TPTM Target Privacy Threat Modeling
Framework
https://insights.sei.cmu.
edu/sei_blog/2018/12/
threat-modeling-12-available-methods.
html
COVID A respiratory illness. It is collo-
quially known as coronavirus.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Coronavirus_disease_2019
TEK Temporary Encryption Key -
used as part of the anonymous
exposure notification protocols.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_
(cryptography)
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